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This paper examines the effect of increased elderly employment in Japan, caused by
the legal obligation of continued employment enacted in 2006, on employment of
other workers and elderly’s own earnings. I find no evidence for substitution
between young full-time workers and elderly workers, while there might be a
modest crowd out of middle-aged female part-time workers. I also find a substantial
decline in earnings of baby boomers, who reached age 60 after 2006, in their early
sixties. These results suggest that firms primarily cut wages of elderly workers, and
some firms reduced the number of female part-time workers.
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1 Introduction
Aging population is emerging as a serious social concern in many developed countries.
Among others, Japan has experienced increased rapid aging in the past few decades. Given
this fast-aging population and resulting pressure on the social security system, the govern-
ment of Japan has been trying to ensure that older people can continue to work longer. At
the same time, there is a concern that the excessive protection of elderly employment may
deprive the youth of employment opportunities. In theory, however, it is not necessary for
employers to reduce the number of younger workers if the wages of older workers fall suf-
ficiently to absorb the increased labor supply. Thus, this paper examines whether the in-
crease in the number of elderly workers affected the employment of other age groups and
whether there were any adjustments through elderly workers’ wages.
Specifically, I focus on the changes around the revision of the Elderly Employment
Stabilization Law (hereafter EESL) in 2006, which mandated employers to continue
employment of their incumbents up to the pension eligibility age. Kondo and Shigeoka
(2015) show that this policy intervention indeed increased employment rate among
men in their early sixties, and the effect is mainly observed in employees in large firms.
In the first half of the empirical analysis, I try to shed light on how the mandated con-
tinued employment due to the EESL revision affects the employment volume of
workers in various age ranges and their part-time/full-time status. The idea is that if
an establishment has more workers in their late fifties right before the EESL revision, it
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would have had more workers reaching age 60 after the EESL revision, to whom it had
to offer continued employment. In the second half of the empirical analysis, I explore
whether there was any adjustment in wages of elderly workers. Specifically, I examine
whether the decline in earnings at age 60 became wider for cohorts eligible for man-
dated continued employment as per the EESL.
Existing studies show mixed evidence about the substitutability between elderly workers
and younger workers. On the one hand, Gruber et al. (2010) argue that there is no evi-
dence of a trade-off between elderly employment and youth employment; rather, there is
a positive association between them based on their study of 12 OECD countries. Munnel
and Wu (2012) and Zhang (2012), who study data pertaining to the USA and China, re-
spectively, also claim that there is no substitution between young and old workers. Earlier
studies for Japan (Oshio and Sato 2010; Nagano, 2014) also show no evidence of a trade-
off between young and old workers. On the other hand, Vestad (2013) shows almost one-
to-one replacement of retired elderly and newly hired young workers in Norway, and
Martins et al. (2009) show substitution between old and young female workers in
Portugal.
Consistent with the first line of the literature, I find that increased elderly employ-
ment is not associated with a decline in hiring of young full-time workers. However, I
also find suggestive evidence that reemployed elderly workers may crowd out middle-
aged part-time female workers. Furthermore, the analysis of earnings shows a signifi-
cant fall in the earnings of male baby boomers (who reached age 60 after the EESL revi-
sion) in their early sixties. These results suggest that in response to the mandated
continued employment by the EESL, firms primarily cut wages of elderly workers, and
some firms reduced the number of female part-time workers. However, most firms did
not decrease hiring of young workers.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 details the institutional back-
ground. Section 3 analyzes the employment of other workers using data from the Em-
ployment Trend Survey, and Section 4 analyzes earnings changes using data from the
Basic Survey on Wage Structure. Section 5 further investigate the relationship between
adjustment through hiring and earnings changes. Section 6 concludes.
2 Institutional background
2.1 Pension Reform Act and the EESL revision
Japan’s population is aging rapidly. As of 2010, the population ratio of elderly people
(65 years or older) was 23.1 % (Population Census of Japan, 2010), which is the highest
among the OECD countries. This rapid aging puts an enormous fiscal pressure on the
social security system. To mitigate this fiscal pressure and slow down the contraction
of the labor force, the government of Japan implemented two major reforms: the Pen-
sion Reform Act in 2001 and the revision of the EESL in 2006. Both reforms are
intended to promote employment of people in their early sixties.
The Pension Reform Act implemented in 2001 gradually raises the eligibility age from
60 to 65 for the fixed part of the pension benefit. When the Pension Reform Act was im-
plemented, many private firms set 60 as the mandatory retirement age. Since the eligibility
age of pension for employed workers had also been 60 until 2001, most employees in pri-
vate companies were able to work until they became eligible for the full pension benefit.
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However, because of the Pension Reform Act, those who turned 60 in April 2001 or later
could no longer start receiving the full pension benefit at the age of 60.
This growing gap between the pension eligibility age and mandatory retirement age,
which was still 60 in most firms, emerged as a serious social concern. To fill this gap, 5 years
after the implementation of the Pension Reform Act, the government of Japan revised the
EESL in order to legally mandate employers to offer continuous employment until the pen-
sion eligibility age. Beginning with those who turned 60 in April 2006 (i.e., those born in
April 1946), employers have to take at least one of the following three measures: (1) raise
the mandatory retirement age to the pension eligibility age, (2) abolish mandatory retire-
ment, or (3) set up a formal rule for employment extension or reemployment.
In reality, more than 80 % of the firms chose the third option.1 Reemployment after
mandatory “retirement” is quite common in Japan. Employees in Japan typically retire
from regular employment (seishain) either in the month in which they turn 60 or at the
end of the fiscal year during which they turn 60. Mandatory “retirement” in Japan merely
means a termination of a so-called “lifetime employment” contract. After this mandatory
retirement, some workers leave the labor force or begin working for a new employer, but
a substantial number of the “retired” employees are reemployed by the same employer on
a different employment contract, namely as non-regular workers, who are typically paid
much lower wages. The EESL revision legally mandated firms to offer such reemployment
opportunities to all employees below the pension eligibility age.
Kondo and Shigeoka (2015) show that this revision actually increased the ratio of sal-
aried workers among men in their early sixties, and the effect is mainly observed in em-
ployees of large companies. Specifically, they find that the introduction of the
mandated continued employment increased the population ratio of salaried workers at
ages 60, 61, and 62 for the cohort born in 1946 by about 1–3 percentage points. They
also find that this increase is mostly attributable to the increase in the number of em-
ployees at firms with 500 or more employees.
As the pension eligibility age kept rising until 65, the mandatory age until when firms
have to offer continued employment was also gradually raised to 64 for the cohort born
in 1947 and later and to 65 for the cohort born in 1949 and later. Kondo and Shigeoka
(2015) also find that the 1-year rise in the pension eligibility age combined with the
mandated continued employment increased the ratio of salaried workers at age 63 by
about 4 percentage points for the cohort born in 1947.
It is important to note that even before the EESL revision, no legal regulation pre-
vented firms from hiring workers older than the mandatory retirement age of 60.
Hence, the increase in employment of the elderly after the EESL revision can be viewed
as a distortion caused by a government intervention. If the EESL forces employers to
hire workers whom they would not hire otherwise, there must be some adjustment in
response to this forced employment, either through changes in employment of workers
in other age ranges or through changes in wages of elderly workers themselves. Hence,
I examine the former in Section 3 and the latter in Section 4.
2.2 Aging of baby boomers and the “year 2007 problem”
The baby boom after World War II was much more concentrated in Japan than in
other countries. Baby boomers in Japan are defined as those born from 1947 to 1949.2
Kondo IZA Journal of Labor Policy  (2016) 5:2 Page 3 of 23
The cohort size of those born in 1947 is over 2.6 million, whereas that of those born in
1943 is 2.3 million.3 Cohorts born in 1948 and 1949 also exceed 2.6 million, and then,
the cohort size shrinks to 2.3 million, the pre-World War II level, for the cohort born
in 1950.
Consequently, in 2007, Japanese firms faced a sharp increase in the number of em-
ployees who reached 60, the mandatory retirement age. According to the Population
Census 2010, the population size of those who reached 60 during November 2006 to
October 20074 is about 2.15 million, whereas the population size of the cohort that is
1 year older is only about 1.34 million. This sharp increase in the number of employees
reaching the mandatory retirement age is called the “year 2007 problem (2007-nen
mondai)” and has been widely publicized in the Japanese media.
This “year 2007 problem” could have affected employers’ behaviors through the fol-
lowing two channels. First, the actual number of employees to whom employers have
to offer continued employment increased, and wages and employment of other workers
may have been adjusted accordingly. Second, in addition to the actual increase in the
number of elderly workers, the publicized image about the year 2007 problem may have
triggered drastic changes in the wage structure and employment scheme. As pointed
out by Hamaaki et al. (2012), population aging and prolonged economic stagnation
brought pressure to flatten the wage–age profile of Japanese firms, which used to be
much steeper than those of other developed countries. At the same time, as shown by
Kawaguchi and Ohtake (2007) and Ariga and Kambayashi (2010), wage cuts harm
workers’ productivity, causing many firms to hesitate before cutting wages. Under these
circumstances, the year 2007 problem might have provided the firms a good excuse to
reform wage profiles.
3 Effects on employment for different ages and type of contract
3.1 Data: establishment panel constructed from the Employment Trend Survey
The main source of data used in this section is the Employment Trend Survey (here-
after ETS) conducted by the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare. I construct a
panel of establishments from the ETS, although, as explained below, the year-on-year
matching of the establishments is not perfect. Another limitation is that the ETS re-
cords the number of employees using a 5-year—and not a 1-year—age range, and thus,
detailed cohort-level analyses are not feasible.
Even with these limitations, however, the ETS is the best available data for the ana-
lysis of employers’ responses to the EESL revision. An important advantage of the use
of establishment-level panel data is that it allows us to control for unobserved establish-
ment fixed effects and industry-wide temporary shocks that are correlated with labor
demand. In particular, when labor demand is high in general, both youth and elderly
employment tend to increase. This may generate a spurious positive correlation be-
tween elderly employment and employment of other age ranges. Industry-level data
would not allow us to control for industry-specific temporary shocks in labor demand.
Another advantage compared to studies using individual-level data combined with age
composition of workers in the local labor market is that establishment-level data are
less likely to pick up changes in the demographic composition caused by fertility dy-
namics and migration.
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Unfortunately, the ETS does not retain a unique establishment identifier over the entire
period, because it is not designed as panel data. However, the sampling weights of the
ETS vary with the establishment size, and it is a complete survey for establishments with
more than 500 employees. Thus, although the survey is designed as a repeated cross sec-
tion, it is possible to construct a panel of establishments with more than 500 employees
so long as the same establishment can be identified across samples of different years.
The respondents of the ETS are sampled from the list of establishments listed in the
Establishment and Enterprise Census (hereafter EEC), which is a complete survey of es-
tablishments conducted every few years by the Statistics Bureau. The respondents to
the ETS are resampled when a new list of establishments based on the new EEC be-
comes available, and the establishment’s identifier (ID) within the ETS is renewed.
Thus, the establishment’s ID within the ETS can be linked for only a few years between
consecutive EECs.
For the years 2004–2011, however, the establishment IDs in the EECs are also avail-
able. Specifically, ETS 2004–2006, ETS 2007–2008, and ETS 2009–2011 can be linked
to EEC 2001, EEC 2004, and EEC 2006, respectively. Since a particular EEC uses the es-
tablishment IDs of the previous EEC, I can link ETS 2004–2011 using the establish-
ment IDs available from the relevant EEC.
Although ETS 2002 and 2003 are also sampled from EEC 1999, the establishment
IDs for this EEC are not available to me. Thus, I use prefectures, number of employees,
and two-digit industries to match the establishments in ETS 2004 and ETS 2003. This
matching is not perfect; only about 60 % of the establishments in the 2003 survey can
be matched with those in the 2004 survey. To link ETS 2002 with later years, I use the
establishment IDs common to ETS 2003 and 2002.
I use the ratio of male full-time employees aged 55–59 as of the end of June 2003 as
a proxy for the impact of the EESL revision in 2006 for each establishment. I choose
2003 as the base year because 2003 is the last year before the EESL revision was passed
and announced in June 2004. I focus on male full-time workers, because in practice, re-
employment after mandatory retirement, which is decreed by the EESL, typically covers
employees who were on full-time regular employment until the mandatory retirement
age. Most women in the relevant cohort do not qualify for this condition.
Furthermore, employers must have considered various ways of adjustment. To
analyze such employers’ behaviors, I use the outcome variables log number of em-
ployees and ratio in total employment of the establishment for the following categories:
total numbers of employees (log only), full-time employees, employees younger than
50, employees aged 50–59, employees aged 60 or older, full-time employees younger
than 25, female part-time employees aged 35–55, and part-time employees aged 60 or
older. The first two variables are intended to analyze the effect on employment level,
which could go either way: the increased number of elderly workers may push up the
total employment, but if it suppresses younger workers’ employment or increases early
retirement before mandatory retirement, total employment could fall. It is also ex ante
ambiguous whether the number of employees younger than 50 will decrease. The effect
on the number of employees aged 50–59 is expected to be negative; this is a mechan-
ical effect in that if the cohort size within a firm is relatively large for those who were
in their late fifties in 2003, that for younger cohorts should be small. Likewise, the ef-
fect on those aged 60 or older is expected to be positive. Reviewing full-time employees
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younger than 25 is intended to measure the degree of substitution or complementarity
between young and old workers, and analyzing the number of female part-time em-
ployees will help capture substitution or complementarity between elderly men on re-
employment contracts and married women on non-regular contracts.
Table 1 presents the sample size and industry composition. The first column shows the
sample used in the main analysis. I limit the sample to establishments that can be tracked
at least from 2003 to 2008. Also, for comparison, I repeat the same analysis, setting 2007
instead of 2003 as the base year. Column (2) shows the sample for this analysis, which in-
cludes establishments that can be tracked from 2006 to 2011. The industry compositions5
of the two samples are very similar. 6 Figure 1 shows the mean of outcome variables over
years. Here, I pool the samples in two columns of Table 1 (many of them overlap).
3.2 Empirical model
As the main specification, I estimate the following equation:
Y ijt ¼ αþ
X
τ≠2003
βτXij20031 t ¼ τð Þ þ vjt þ ui þ εijt ð1Þ
where Yijt is the outcome variable of establishment i in industry j observed in year t,
Xij2003 is the ratio of male full-time employees aged 55–59 among all male full-time
employees in 2003, and βτ, the coefficient of Xij, varies with the year and is normalized
to 0 in 2003, the base year. vjt represents the industry-year effect, and ui represents the
Table 1 Summary statistics of the Employment Trade Survey
2002–2008, base year =
2003 (main sample)
2006–2011, base year =
2007 (comparison)
Sample size in the base year 1024 1114
Mean % of age 55–59 in male full-time employees
in the base year
9.1 % 11.0 %
Mean % of age 55–59 in male full-time employees
in the previous year (t−1)
Total number of employees 1304.0 1271.8
Full-time employees 1245.8 1179.3
Number of employees younger than 50 1017.7 986.5
Number of employees 50–59 years old 261.5 237.0
Number of employees 60 years old or older 24.9 48.4
Number of full-time employees younger than 25 124.5 122.2
Number of female part-time employees 35–54 years old 28.6 33.8
Number of part-time employees 60 years old or older 4.3 9.0
Industry composition
Manufacture 54.8 % 55.9 %
Information and communication 3.4 % 3.6 %
Trade 4.7 % 4.8 %
Finance 2.5 % 2.3 %
Medical and nursing 23.0 % 19.8 %
Other services 5.4 % 9.3 %
Other non-service industries 6.3 % 4.6 %
Establishments with 500 or more employees
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establishment fixed effect. εijt is the remaining error, which may be correlated within
the establishment over time. To consider this potential correlation for εijt, standard er-
rors are clustered at the establishment level.7
βτ represents changes in the outcome variables for establishments that, relative to
other establishments, had more employees reaching age 60 under the legal obliga-
tion of continued employment until the pension eligibility age. It is intended to
capture employers’ responses to the EESL revision. If a plot of βτ over τ shows
some trend breaks around 2006, such a change in trend is likely to be attributable
to the revision of the EESL implemented in 2006. On the other hand, if the plot
of βτ shows some secular trend, it may simply reflect a dynamic pattern of em-
ployee age composition not related to the EESL. If so, changing the base year
should not change such secular trends. To check this, I also estimate the same
equation replacing the base year with 2007, 1 year after the implementation of the
revised EESL.
The reason I do not use the ratio of workers currently over 60 is that even
under the revised EESL, a substantial number of workers retire at the age of 60.
This is particularly a concern for large firms; Kondo (2014) show that 30 % of
those who were employed at firms with more than 1000 employees retire at age 60
even after the EESL revision in 2006. How many employees retire at age 60 would
be presumably correlated with the firm’s adjustment in other workers’ employment
and the wage offers made to employees over 60. For example, firms that do not
want to reduce the number of young workers may want to induce more employees
to voluntarily “retire” at age 60, generating a spurious negative correlation between


























































2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
Total # of employees Full-time employees Younger than 50
50-59 years old 60 or older Full-time younger than 25
Female part-time 35-54 years old Part-time 60 or older
year
Fig. 1 Mean of outcome variables in Employment Trade Survey, by year
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It would be also informative to estimate the effect of previous years’ employment
shares of workers in their late fifties on the same set of outcomes. For this purpose, I
estimate the following equation:
Y ijt ¼ αþ βtXijt−1 þ vjt þ ui þ εijt ð2Þ
Xijt−1 is the ratio of male full-time employees aged 55–59 among all male full-time
employees in the previous year, and the other variables are the same as in equation (2).
Furthermore, for the following outcome variables, it is possible to calculate the “pre-
dicted” number of workers in year t from the data in year t−5: employees aged 30–49
(instead of younger than 50), employees aged 50–59, employees aged 60 or older, fe-
male part-time employees aged 35–55, and part-time employees aged 60 or older.8 For
example, the predicted number of employees aged 30–49 in 2008 is calculated as the
number of employees aged 25–44 in 2003. For these outcome variables, I define the ra-
tio of the actual number in 2008 to the predicted number calculated from the 2003 sur-
vey and estimate the following equation:
Y ij2008=⌢Y ij2008 ¼ αþ βXij2003 þ vj þ εijt ð3Þ
The estimated β implies the effect of the ratio of workers who are subject to contin-
ued employment mandated by the revised EESL on deviation of the employment from
the predicted path.
3.3 Results
Table 2 shows estimates of βτ in equation (1), the coefficients of the interaction term of
the ratio of male full-time workers aged 55–59 in 2003 to year dummies. Column (1)
shows that establishments that had relatively more male full-time employees in their late
fifties before the EESL revision reduced their relative employment size. The size of the ef-
fect is, however, modest: a 1 % point increase in the share of male full-time workers aged
55–59 in 2003 reduces the total employment by at most 0.4 % in 2008. Furthermore, col-
umns (2) and (3) show insignificant effects on full-time employees and those younger than
50. As expected, columns (4) and (5) show that the number of employees in their fifties
decreases and that in their sixties increases. This is a mechanical change, since those who
were in their late fifties in 2003 enter their early sixties by 2008.
Interestingly, the ratio of male full-time workers aged 55–59 in 2003 has a signifi-
cantly positive effect on the number of full-time employees younger than 25. This im-
plies that even under the mandated continued employment under the EESL, employers
hire young workers as more incumbent workers reach 60. In other words, hiring of
new graduates increases as the number of workers who reach the mandatory retirement
age increases, even if firms have to offer reemployment opportunities after the
mandatory retirement. This result suggests that reemployed elderly workers do not per-
fectly substitute young full-time workers.
In contrast, there is a significantly negative effect for female part-time workers aged
35–54 after the EESL was revised in 2006. Moreover, the number of part-time em-
ployees aged 60 or older significantly increased. These results suggest that reemployed
elderly workers, many of whom are part-time, and female part-time workers, many of
whom are married and the secondary earners in their respective households, are
substitutes.
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Table 2 The effect of the ratio of 55–59 years old in male full-time workers in 2003 on log number
of various types of employees




















Ratio of age 55–59
in 2003 × 2002
0.065 0.034 0.133** 0.027 −0.333 0.044 −0.045 −0.091
[0.059] [0.053] [0.059] [0.112] [0.255] [0.153] [0.213] [0.172]
Ratio of age 55–59
in 2003 × 2004
0.013 0.052 0.04 −0.159 0.339 0.614*** −0.091 0.278
[0.045] [0.047] [0.044] [0.104] [0.299] [0.206] [0.199] [0.255]
Ratio of age 55–59
in 2003 × 2005
−0.083 −0.014 −0.005 −0.555*** 0.817** 0.919*** −0.094 0.372
[0.070] [0.071] [0.082] [0.177] [0.338] [0.286] [0.226] [0.319]
Ratio of age 55–59
in 2003 × 2006
−0.189** −0.091 −0.062 −0.912*** 1.180*** 1.259*** −0.26 0.751**
[0.083] [0.084] [0.102] [0.239] [0.420] [0.329] [0.249] [0.367]
Ratio of age 55–59
in 2003 × 2007
−0.166 0.114 0.149 −1.642*** 0.953 2.173*** −0.860* 0.459
[0.161] [0.236] [0.209] [0.481] [0.695] [0.622] [0.485] [0.513]
Ratio of age 55–59
in 2003 × 2008
−0.347*** −0.193 −0.059 −1.883*** 0.743 1.515*** −0.487 0.597
[0.102] [0.125] [0.137] [0.449] [0.693] [0.463] [0.304] [0.624]
Observations 6745 6745 6745 6745 6745 6745 6745 6745
R-squared 0.03 0.019 0.024 0.091 0.266 0.064 0.046 0.09
Number of
establishments
1024 1024 1024 1024 1024 1024 1024 1024
Note: Standard errors with clustering for establishment ID are presented in brackets. *, **, *** indicate coefficients are
statistically significantly different from 0 at the 10, 5, and 1 % levels, respectively. Control variables omitted from the
table include industry-year dummies. Establishment fixed effects are also controlled
Table 3 The effect of the ratio of 55–59 years old in male full-time workers in 2003 on
employment share of various types of employees


















Ratio of age 55–59 in
2003 × 2002
0.000 0.026 −0.019 −0.007 −0.030*** −0.020 0.004
[0.010] [0.018] [0.014] [0.012] [0.008] [0.016] [0.006]
Ratio of age 55–59 in
2003 × 2004
−0.002 0.020** −0.025* 0.005 0.043*** −0.005 −0.001
[0.006] [0.010] [0.014] [0.008] [0.011] [0.008] [0.005]
Ratio of age 55–59 in
2003 × 2005
0.007 0.056* −0.081*** 0.025** 0.082*** −0.022*** 0.002
[0.014] [0.029] [0.031] [0.011] [0.017] [0.008] [0.009]
Ratio of age 55–59 in
2003 × 2006
0.010 0.094** −0.129*** 0.035*** 0.105*** −0.028* 0.001
[0.019] [0.041] [0.045] [0.013] [0.022] [0.017] [0.009]
Ratio of age 55–59 in
2003 × 2007
0.114* 0.211** −0.256*** 0.045* 0.148*** −0.106* −0.002
[0.067] [0.090] [0.093] [0.027] [0.034] [0.064] [0.011]
Ratio of age 55–59 in
2003 × 2008
0.005 0.196*** −0.302*** 0.106*** 0.138*** −0.044 0.002
[0.025] [0.073] [0.098] [0.033] [0.030] [0.029] [0.012]
Observations 6745 6745 6745 6745 6745 6745 6745
R-squared 0.032 0.071 0.113 0.148 0.112 0.035 0.045
Number of establishments 1024 1024 1024 1024 1024 1024 1024
Note: Standard errors with clustering for establishment ID are presented in brackets. *, **, *** indicate coefficients are
statistically significantly different from 0 at the 10, 5, and 1 % levels, respectively. Control variables omitted from the
table include industry-year dummies. Establishment fixed effects are also controlled
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Table 3 confirms the same pattern when the outcome variables are employment share
rather than the log of number of employees.
Tables 4 and 5 show the estimated effect of the ratio of employees aged 55–59 in
2007 instead of 2003, and Fig. 2 compares the estimated βτs in Tables 2 and 4. For
some reason, the numbers of total employees, full-time employees, and employees
younger than 50 are smaller in the base year (2007) than those in the other years; thus,
most of the coefficients are positive, and many of them are statistically significant. This
should be interpreted as an anomaly for 2007. For the numbers of employees in their
fifties and sixties and the number of full-time employees younger than 25, a pattern
similar to Table 2 is observed. In contrast, the number of female part-time workers
does not decrease when the base year is set to 2007. This may imply that the substitu-
tion between female part-time workers and reemployed elderly workers was caused by
the revised EESL, and once the adjustment was complete, the number of female part-
time workers stopped decreasing.
Tables 6 and 7 show the estimated effect of the ratio of employees aged 55–59
in the previous year, as in equation (2). Columns (1) and (2) of Table 6 show that
the ratio of employees aged 55–59 started to have a negative effect on total em-
ployment after the revised EESL was implemented in 2006. Columns (3) to (5)
show that this decline results from the number of employees younger than 50.
Note that, however, this result may simply imply that establishments with a higher
ratio of older workers tend to have fewer young workers and that more workers
are retiring from such establishments. Indeed, column (6) shows a positive effect
on the number of full-time workers younger than 25 after the EESL revision. This
may mean that these establishments are trying to hire young workers to fill the
Table 4 The effect of the ratio of 55–59 years old in male full-time workers in 2007 on log number
of various types of employees





















Ratio of age 55–59
in 2007 × 2006
0.350* 0.626*** 0.685*** −0.391 −1.640*** 1.303*** −0.348 −0.740*
[0.203] [0.232] [0.229] [0.298] [0.393] [0.380] [0.721] [0.378]
Ratio of age 55–59
in 2007 × 2008
0.051 0.276 0.577*** −1.492*** −0.777** 1.532*** −0.228 0.268
[0.173] [0.230] [0.200] [0.233] [0.372] [0.364] [0.650] [0.338]
Ratio of age 55–59
in 2007 × 2009
0.145 0.366 0.871*** −2.122*** −0.394 1.960*** −0.04 0.11
[0.190] [0.251] [0.237] [0.268] [0.435] [0.429] [0.686] [0.478]
Ratio of age 55–59
in 2007 × 2010
0.032 0.193 0.887*** −2.854*** −0.229 1.840*** 0.151 0.823*
[0.180] [0.242] [0.203] [0.273] [0.448] [0.400] [0.707] [0.461]
Ratio of age 55–59
in 2007 × 2011
0.197 0.4 1.237*** −3.252*** −0.024 2.502*** 0.393 0.861*
[0.197] [0.257] [0.240] [0.299] [0.460] [0.434] [0.687] [0.455]
Observations 6210 6210 6210 6210 6210 6210 6210 6210
R-squared 0.034 0.027 0.052 0.137 0.287 0.063 0.04 0.085
Number of
establishments
1114 1114 1114 1114 1114 1114 1114 1114
Note: Standard errors with clustering for establishment ID are presented in brackets. *, **, *** indicate coefficients are
statistically significantly different from 0 at the 10, 5, and 1 % levels, respectively. Control variables omitted from the
table include industry-year dummies. Establishment fixed effects are also controlled
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Table 5 The effect of the ratio of 55–59 years old in male full-time workers in 2007 on
employment share of various types of employees





















Ratio of age 55–59
in 2007 × 2006
0.350* 0.626*** 0.685*** −0.391 −1.640*** 1.303*** −0.348 −0.740*
[0.203] [0.232] [0.229] [0.298] [0.393] [0.380] [0.721] [0.378]
Ratio of age 55–59
in 2007 × 2008
0.051 0.276 0.577*** −1.492*** −0.777** 1.532*** −0.228 0.268
[0.173] [0.230] [0.200] [0.233] [0.372] [0.364] [0.650] [0.338]
Ratio of age 55–59
in 2007 × 2009
0.145 0.366 0.871*** −2.122*** −0.394 1.960*** −0.04 0.11
[0.190] [0.251] [0.237] [0.268] [0.435] [0.429] [0.686] [0.478]
Ratio of age 55–59
in 2007 × 2010
0.032 0.193 0.887*** −2.854*** −0.229 1.840*** 0.151 0.823*
[0.180] [0.242] [0.203] [0.273] [0.448] [0.400] [0.707] [0.461]
Ratio of age 55–59
in 2007 × 2011
0.197 0.4 1.237*** −3.252*** −0.024 2.502*** 0.393 0.861*
[0.197] [0.257] [0.240] [0.299] [0.460] [0.434] [0.687] [0.455]
Observations 6210 6210 6210 6210 6210 6210 6210 6210
R-squared 0.034 0.027 0.052 0.137 0.287 0.063 0.04 0.085
Number of
establishments
1114 1114 1114 1114 1114 1114 1114 1114
Note: Standard errors with clustering for establishment ID are presented in brackets. *, **, *** indicate coefficients are
statistically significantly different from 0 at the 10, 5, and 1 % levels, respectively. Control variables omitted from the
table include industry-year dummies. Establishment fixed effects are also controlled
Fig. 2 The effects of the ratios of 55–59 years old in male full-time workers in 2003 and 2007 on selected
outcomes (log number of employees)
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positions of the retirees. The effect on the number of female part-time employees
is significantly negative only in the few years after the EESL revision, and there is
a positive effect on the number of part-time employees older than 60. Table 7 con-
firms the same observations for the employment ratio.
Table 8 shows the estimated coefficients of the ratio of employees aged 55–59 in 2003
on the ratios of the actual number of employees in 2008 to the predicted numbers. Col-
umn (1) shows a greater than predicted increase in the number of employees aged 30–49.
Interestingly, establishments with a higher ratio of workers aged 55–59 in 2003 tended to
decrease the number of workers aged 60 or older in 2008. This might imply that even
under the continued employment mandated by the revised EESL, establishments that
have too many older workers tried to reduce their numbers. Although not statistically
Table 6 The effect of the ratio of 55–59 years old in male full-time workers in the previous year on
log number of various types of employees























0.091 0.022 −0.559*** 2.977*** 1.082** −0.29 0.364 −1.008**




0.042 0.031 −0.629*** 2.614*** 1.377** −0.419 0.181 −0.315




0.061 0.101 −0.623*** 2.703*** 1.603*** 0.148 0.131 −0.189




−0.005 0.099 −0.683*** 2.592*** 2.411*** 0.785** 0.079 −0.258




−0.106 −0.03 −0.700*** 1.980*** 2.037*** 0.819** −0.047 0.318




−0.137 0.389* −0.502*** 1.009*** 2.025*** 2.001*** −0.955* 0.078




−0.272*** −0.125 −0.641*** 0.740*** 2.737*** 1.253*** −0.244 0.786**




−0.254*** −0.241*** −0.557*** 0.281* 3.223*** 1.299*** 0.248 1.466***




−0.356*** −0.427*** −0.557*** −0.359* 3.513*** 1.716*** 0.670* 2.031***




−0.359*** −0.368*** −0.482*** −0.786*** 4.756*** 2.365*** 0.574 2.398***
[0.122] [0.131] [0.148] [0.299] [0.555] [0.435] [0.447] [0.497]
Observations 11,740 11,740 11,740 11,740 11,740 11,740 11,740 11,740
R-squared 0.045 0.037 0.04 0.146 0.387 0.07 0.078 0.147
Number of
establishments
1696 1696 1696 1696 1696 1696 1696 1696
Note: Standard errors with clustering for establishment ID are presented in brackets. *, **, *** indicate coefficients are
statistically significantly different from 0 at the 10, 5, and 1 % levels, respectively. Control variables omitted from the
table include industry-year dummies. Establishment fixed effects are also controlled
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Table 7 The effect of the ratio of 55–59 years old in male full-time workers in the previous year on
employment share of various types of employees

















Ratio of age 55–59
in 2001 × 2002
0.026 −0.468*** 0.566*** −0.098*** −0.114*** 0.009 −0.009
[0.023] [0.094] [0.113] [0.027] [0.036] [0.018] [0.007]
Ratio of age 55–59
in 2002 × 2003
−0.004 −0.454*** 0.519*** −0.065** −0.097*** 0.016 0.003
[0.030] [0.086] [0.103] [0.029] [0.029] [0.031] [0.014]
Ratio of age 55–59
in 2003 × 2004
0.007 −0.466*** 0.541*** −0.075*** −0.063*** 0.01 −0.002
[0.026] [0.072] [0.083] [0.021] [0.023] [0.021] [0.007]
Ratio of age 55–59
in 2004 × 2005
0.027 −0.469*** 0.523*** −0.054*** −0.016 −0.017 0.003
[0.022] [0.046] [0.049] [0.018] [0.020] [0.016] [0.007]
Ratio of age 55–59
in 2005 × 2006
0.006 −0.395*** 0.434*** −0.040** 0.004 −0.011 0.005
[0.020] [0.049] [0.053] [0.017] [0.017] [0.015] [0.006]
Ratio of age 55−59
in 2006 × 2007
0.173*** −0.239*** 0.267*** −0.028 0.045** −0.135** 0
[0.062] [0.050] [0.040] [0.024] [0.021] [0.056] [0.007]
Ratio of age 55–59
in 2007 × 2008
0.019 −0.242*** 0.212*** 0.030* 0.040** −0.040** 0.007
[0.027] [0.036] [0.039] [0.016] [0.020] [0.020] [0.005]
Ratio of age 55–59
in 2008 × 2009
−0.017 −0.194*** 0.102*** 0.093*** 0.079*** −0.024 0.017***
[0.022] [0.030] [0.033] [0.018] [0.020] [0.017] [0.006]
Ratio of age 55–59
in 2009 × 2010
−0.055** −0.131*** −0.021 0.152*** 0.122*** −0.014 0.033***
[0.023] [0.036] [0.039] [0.020] [0.022] [0.017] [0.009]
Ratio of age 55–59
in 2010 × 2011
−0.043 −0.089* −0.120** 0.209*** 0.169*** −0.023 0.043***
[0.026] [0.047] [0.055] [0.021] [0.026] [0.019] [0.010]
Observations 11,740 11,740 11,740 11,740 11,740 11,740 11,740
R-squared 0.043 0.136 0.234 0.29 0.127 0.051 0.13
Number of
establishments
1696 1696 1696 1696 1696 1696 1696
Note: Standard errors with clustering for establishment ID are presented in brackets. *, **, *** indicate coefficients are
statistically significantly different from 0 at the 10, 5, and 1 % levels, respectively. Control variables omitted from the
table include industry-year dummies. Establishment fixed effects are also controlled
Table 8 The effect of the ratio of 55–59 years old in male full-time workers in 2003 on the ratio of
actual number of employees to predicted number of employees in 2008
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)




Ratio of age 55–59 in 2003 0.706*** 0.046 −0.502* −0.549 0.739
[0.166] [0.211] [0.304] [0.515] [1.453]
Observations 918 918 917 573 431
R-squared 0.074 0.011 0.049 0.047 0.144
Note: Robust standard errors are presented in brackets. *, **, *** indicate coefficients are statistically significantly different
from 0 at the 10, 5, and 1 % levels, respectively. Control variables omitted from the table include industry dummies
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significant, the effect for female part-time workers is negative and that for part-time
workers older than 60 is positive, consistent with the results in Tables 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7.
To summarize, the results revealed in this section show no evidence of substitution
between old workers and young full-time workers. Neither is there any evidence of a
negative effect of the EESL revision on opportunities for full-time employment for
youth. Instead, though not very strong, there might have been a substitution effect for
female part-time workers, especially during the few years after the EESL revision.
4 Effects on elderly’s earnings
4.1 Data: basic survey on wage structure
The main source of data used in this section is the Basic Survey on Wage Struc-
ture (hereafter BSWS), conducted by the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare.
The BSWS is cross-sectional survey of establishments. It asks surveyed establish-
ments to choose their employees randomly to answer detailed information about
their salaries, employment status, gender, age, and educational background.9 It
also provides information at the establishment level, such as industry type and
firm size. I pool all workers in the BSWS surveys conducted from 1998 to 2011.
I use annual earnings excluding bonus as the outcome variable. Overtime pay
and other compensations are included. I exclude bonus because the survey records
monthly earnings in June of the survey year and the bonus of the previous calen-
dar year. This is particularly a problem when analyzing the wage changes at retire-
ment and reemployment, because a 60-year-old worker who is currently on a
reemployment contract may refer to the bonus he received before the mandatory
retirement.
I limit the sample to male regular employees aged 48–65 and born from 1943
to 1949. More precisely, since the BSWS includes only the age as of June of the
survey year, and the EESL defines cohort as those born between April of that
year and March of the next year, I define the cohort as (survey year age—1).
Thus, the sample includes male regular employees born between July 1943 and
June 1950.
Table 9 Summary statistics of the Basic Survey of Wage Structure
Sample size (total) 1,357,477
Annual earnings excluding bonus (thousand yen) 4984.0
Log annual earnings 8.42
Education
Junior high school 19.8 %
High school 55.6 %
Tech/junior college (2 years) 3.7 %
4-year college and more 20.9 %
Firm size
Large (500 or more) 38.8 %
Medium (100–499) 23.5 %
Small (less than 100) 37.7 %
Male regular employees 48–65 years old, born in 1943–1949
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Table 9 presents the summary statistics, and Fig. 3 shows the earnings profile
of employees aged 55–65. As seen from the figure, earnings drop sharply at 60.
The annual earnings before the employee reaches age 60 are, on average, about 5
million yen, and they drop to less than 4 million yen. Figure 3 also shows how
the profile has changed over different cohorts; the decline after age 60 becomes
slightly steeper for younger cohorts.
4.2 Empirical model
To measure the relative changes in earnings after age 60 for each birth-year cohort, I
estimate the following equation:





γθ1 c ¼ θð Þ  1 aci≥60ð Þ þ δXci þ εci
ð4Þ
where aci is the age of the individual i who was born in year c, and the first half of the right-
hand side is intended to approximate the shape of the earnings profile around age 60.10 The
parameter of my interest is the coefficient of the interaction term between the cohort
dummy and dummy for being older than 60, γθ. It captures the differences in the drop in
earnings at age 60 across cohorts. Xci includes other control variables such as education, co-
hort dummies, and calendar year dummies.
It is important to note that the observed change in the earnings drop at age 60 may
reflect two different effects. The first effect is the genuine earnings decline for equally
productive workers. The second effect refers to the compositional change in workers
who continue to work after the mandatory retirement age. Presumably, those who were
able to continue to work before the EESL revision were positively selected, and thus,
the earnings of those older than 60 may fall after the EESL revision just by reflecting
this compositional effect. Unfortunately, the lack of worker-level panel data makes it
very difficult to distinguish these two effects.
Fig. 3 Earnings profile of age 55–65, by cohort
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4.3 Results
Table 10 presents γθs, the estimated drop in earnings at age 60 of cohort θ relative to cohort
1945. Figure 4 plots the estimated coefficients in columns (1), (3), and (4) over θ. Column
(1) reports estimates from the entire sample; the cohort born in 1947 and later experience
larger declines in earnings at age 60. The timing of this decline is 1 year later than the EESL
revision and coincides with the so-called year 2007 problem. To put it another way, the
baby boomers experienced larger earnings declines upon their mandatory retirement and
Table 10 The estimated drop in earnings at age 60 by cohort, relative to cohort 1945
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sample All All Large firm(emp > 500) Small firm(emp < 100)
Cohort 1943 −0.001 0.004 −0.005 −0.006
[0.010] [0.010] [0.020] [0.014]
Cohort 1944 0 0.004 −0.001 −0.006
[0.010] [0.010] [0.022] [0.014]
Cohort 1946 −0.001 −0.012 −0.013 0.01
[0.009] [0.009] [0.018] [0.012]
Cohort 1947 −0.018* −0.031*** −0.036* −0.017
[0.010] [0.010] [0.019] [0.014]
Cohort 1948 −0.034*** −0.045*** −0.076*** −0.022
[0.012] [0.012] [0.023] [0.016]
Cohort 1949 −0.066*** −0.077*** −0.104*** −0.041**
[0.015] [0.015] [0.032] [0.020]
Control for industry and firm size No Yes No No
Observations 1,357,477 1,307,879 526,316 512,090
R-squared 0.247 0.352 0.316 0.143
Note: Standard errors with clustering for establishment ID are presented in brackets. *, **, *** indicate coefficients are
statistically significantly different from 0 at the 10, 5, and 1 % levels, respectively. Control variables omitted from the
table include age, age squared, over 60 dummy, over 60 dummy × age, over 60 dummy × age squared, education
dummies, cohort dummies, and calendar year dummies
Fig. 4 The estimated drop in earnings at age 60 relative to cohort 1945, by cohort and firm size
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reemployment. Column (2) confirms that the results do not change much when industry
and firm size are controlled.
Columns (3) and (4) report the estimates from subsamples of large and small firms. The
decline in relative earnings of baby boomers is much greater in large firms. This is
Table 11 The effect of the ratio of 55–59 years old in male full-time workers in 2003 on log
number of various types of employees, interacted with the change in earnings drop at age 60
between cohorts 1943–1945 and 1946–1948






















Ratio of age 55–59
in 2003 × 2002
0.077 0.036 0.125* 0.069 −0.231 −0.085 0.127 −0.006
[0.067] [0.061] [0.071] [0.108] [0.282] [0.157] [0.227] [0.163]
Ratio of age 55–59
in 2003 × 2002 ×
earnings drop at
age 60
−0.211 −0.138 −0.114 −0.356 −0.64 0.506 −0.416 −0.946**
[0.140] [0.165] [0.163] [0.221] [0.742] [0.338] [0.384] [0.415]
Ratio of age 55–59
in 2003 × 2004
0.038 0.058 0.04 −0.036 0.261 0.558** −0.141 0.037
[0.056] [0.053] [0.045] [0.161] [0.409] [0.276] [0.246] [0.298]
Ratio of age 55–59
in 2003 × 2004 ×
earnings drop at
age 60
−0.258 0.009 −0.151 −0.593 0.775 0.399 0.641 1.372
[0.158] [0.129] [0.111] [0.506] [1.306] [0.757] [0.628] [0.886]
Ratio of age 55–59
in 2003 × 2005
−0.091 −0.041 0.015 −0.523*** 0.822** 1.043*** −0.166 0.106
[0.087] [0.077] [0.086] [0.176] [0.413] [0.308] [0.272] [0.325]
Ratio of age 55–59
in 2003 × 2005 ×
earnings drop at
age 60
−0.042 0.244 −0.295 0.298 0.708 0.236 0.777 1.584*
[0.223] [0.178] [0.212] [0.508] [1.263] [0.885] [0.643] [0.864]
Ratio of age 55–59
in 2003 × 2006
−0.172* −0.096 0.007 −0.867*** 1.231** 1.496*** −0.206 0.635
[0.096] [0.087] [0.103] [0.236] [0.565] [0.368] [0.286] [0.432]
Ratio of age 55–59
in 2003 × 2006 ×
earnings drop at
age 60
−0.245 0.062 −0.595*** 0.304 −0.526 −0.766 0.394 0.579
[0.268] [0.228] [0.223] [0.749] [1.677] [1.113] [0.686] [1.203]
Ratio of age 55–59
in 2003 × 2007
−0.09 0.164 0.193 −1.368*** 1.319 2.054*** −1.162** 0.41
[0.144] [0.251] [0.125] [0.459] [0.877] [0.557] [0.566] [0.587]
Ratio of age 55–59
in 2003 × 2007 ×
earnings drop at
age 60
−0.552 0.176 −1.068*** 0.284 −0.378 −0.6 2.057 1.376
[0.433] [0.523] [0.387] [1.334] [2.506] [1.758] [1.715] [1.606]
Ratio of age 55–59
in 2003 × 2008
−0.344*** −0.208 0.028 −1.842*** 0.606 1.844*** −0.463 0.387
[0.117] [0.130] [0.137] [0.468] [0.876] [0.514] [0.349] [0.746]
Ratio of age 55–59
in 2003 × 2008 ×
earnings drop at
age 60
−0.101 0.298 −0.683** 1.126 1.94 −1.145 0.602 2.955
[0.328] [0.335] [0.298] [1.496] [2.733] [1.444] [0.821] [2.356]
Observations 6108 6108 6108 6108 6108 6108 6108 6108
R-squared 0.031 0.016 0.027 0.084 0.283 0.072 0.051 0.099
Number of
establishments
925 925 925 925 925 925 925 925
Note: Standard errors with clustering for establishment ID are presented in brackets. *, **, *** indicate coefficients are
statistically significantly different from 0 at the 10, 5, and 1 % levels, respectively. Control variables omitted from the
table include industry-year dummies. Establishment fixed effects are also controlled
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consistent with the results of Kondo and Shigeoka (2015); the increase in elderly employ-
ment due to the EESL is mainly observed in large firms, because the mandatory retirement
policy was implemented more strictly at large firms.
5 Interaction between employment and earnings adjustments
So far, I have analyzed employment and earnings adjustments separately, even though
the employer may take decisions about employment and earnings simultaneously. This
is mainly due to data limitations; the different sampling schemes of the ETS and BSWS
make it difficult to match the two datasets. As explained in Section 3, the panel data
constructed from the ETS includes establishments with 500 or more employees. How-
ever, the BSWS is a random sample from the population of establishments, with sam-
pling weights depending on the industry, firm size, and region, and unlike the ETS, it is
not a complete survey of large establishments. Therefore, except for a few specific es-
tablishments that represent a specific firm size of a specific industry in a specific re-
gion, most establishments are not covered by the BSWS every year. Hence, matching
the BSWS with the ETS not only reduces the sample size substantially but also causes a
potentially severe sample selection bias.
In order to avoid these problems, I match the changes in earnings estimated for
each industry–region cell from the BSWS to the establishments in the ETS, instead
of matching the individual establishments. Admittedly, this approach takes the
earnings drop at age 60 as given and examines how it affects employment adjust-
ment. In reality, the capacity to adjust employment may also affect earnings adjust-
ments. Yet, it is very difficult to model the joint determination of earnings and
employment adjustments using two separate datasets on employment and earnings
that do not match at the individual establishment level. The reason I choose to
Fig. 5 The estimated effects of the ratios of 55–59 years old in male full-time workers in 2003, by percentile
of the changes in earnings drop at age 60 between cohorts 1943–1945 and cohorts 1946–1948
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Table 12 The effect of the ratio of 55–59 years old in male full-time workers in the previous year
on log number of various types of employees, interacted with the change in earnings drop at age
60 between cohorts 1943–1945 and 1946–1948






















Ratio of age 55–59
in 2001 × 2002
0.036 −0.051 −0.764*** 3.494*** 0.739 −1.344*** 0.961 −1.141*
[0.147] [0.179] [0.180] [0.334] [0.659] [0.460] [0.661] [0.614]
Ratio of age 55–59
in 2001 × 2002 ×
earnings drop at
age 60
0.27 −0.039 1.178** −3.605*** −0.268 4.065*** −2.621 0.388
[0.440] [0.497] [0.551] [1.396] [1.970] [1.517] [1.699] [1.967]
Ratio of age 55–59
in 2002 × 2003
−0.013 −0.008 −0.669*** 2.426*** 1.304** −0.68 0.232 −0.188
[0.100] [0.117] [0.170] [0.522] [0.613] [0.439] [0.433] [0.641]
Ratio of age 55–59
in 2002 × 2003 ×
earnings drop at
age 60
0.602* −0.135 0.848* 0.106 −2.117 0.637 −0.685 −1.87
[0.326] [0.365] [0.495] [1.845] [2.164] [1.731] [1.270] [2.442]
Ratio of age 55–59
in 2003 × 2004
−0.004 0.049 −0.748*** 2.770*** 1.436*** −0.256 0.105 −0.387
[0.110] [0.116] [0.169] [0.345] [0.484] [0.449] [0.445] [0.467]
Ratio of age 55–59
in 2003 × 2004 ×
earnings drop at
age 60
0.381 −0.05 0.995** −1.719 −0.757 1.287 0.12 0.588
[0.364] [0.388] [0.471] [1.148] [1.550] [1.555] [1.239] [1.649]
Ratio of age 55–59
in 2004 × 2005
−0.138 −0.008 −0.843*** 2.566*** 2.263*** 0.58 −0.009 −0.451
[0.099] [0.108] [0.129] [0.217] [0.451] [0.368] [0.393] [0.451]
Ratio of age 55–59
in 2004 × 2005 ×
earnings drop at
age 60
0.556 0.14 0.839* −0.92 −1.128 0.575 0.071 1.043
[0.381] [0.432] [0.495] [0.954] [1.534] [1.611] [1.168] [1.563]
Ratio of age 55–59
in 2005 × 2006
−0.189** −0.091 −0.776*** 1.918*** 1.994*** 0.757** −0.064 0.177
[0.083] [0.102] [0.104] [0.310] [0.488] [0.308] [0.346] [0.409]
Ratio of age 55–59
in 2005 × 2006 ×
earnings drop at
age 60
0.271 −0.149 0.411 −0.526 −2.278 −0.317 −0.121 −0.029
[0.350] [0.427] [0.443] [0.859] [1.565] [1.414] [1.107] [1.525]
Ratio of age 55–59
in 2006 × 2007
−0.18 0.371 −0.610*** 1.170*** 2.478*** 1.666*** −1.128** 0.203
[0.168] [0.245] [0.183] [0.248] [0.535] [0.435] [0.505] [0.488]
Ratio of age 55–59
in 2006 × 2007 ×
earnings drop at
age 60
0.325 −0.044 0.321 −0.32 −2.085 −0.252 2.458 0.885
[0.461] [0.557] [0.559] [0.822] [1.666] [1.467] [1.563] [1.583]
Ratio of age 55−59
in 2007 × 2008
−0.374*** −0.224* −0.703*** 0.601*** 2.858*** 1.349*** −0.219 0.787*
[0.096] [0.119] [0.113] [0.172] [0.432] [0.344] [0.351] [0.409]
Ratio of age 55–59
in 2007 × 2008 ×
earnings drop at
age 60
0.364 0.143 0.234 0.426 −1.803 −0.84 0.036 0.47
[0.319] [0.386] [0.403] [0.658] [1.579] [1.339] [1.049] [1.380]
Ratio of age 55–59
in 2008 × 2009
−0.290*** −0.273*** −0.553*** 0.314** 3.280*** 1.425*** 0.318 1.545***
[0.089] [0.098] [0.111] [0.149] [0.446] [0.343] [0.344] [0.408]
Ratio of age 55–59
in 2008 × 2009 ×
earnings drop at
age 60
0.332 0.067 0.408 −0.188 −1.394 −0.699 0.112 2.09
[0.326] [0.370] [0.395] [0.672] [1.600] [1.193] [1.164] [1.417]
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take earnings as given, rather than employment, is that the sample size of the
BSWS is much larger, thus allowing me to estimate industry–region level adjust-
ment measures more precisely.
Specifically, I first estimate equation (4) for subsamples of the BSWS defined by in-
dustry and region. Then, for each industry–region cell, I calculate the average change
in the earnings drop at age 60 between cohorts born from 1943 to 1945 and from 1946
to 1948 for industry–region cell r as follows:
Dr ¼ γ1946 þ γ1947 þ γ19483 −
γ1943 þ γ1944 þ 0
3
Then, I add the interaction terms between the ratio of employees aged 55–59 in the
base year or previous year and Dr to equations (1) and (2):
Y ijrt ¼ αþ
X
τ≠2003
β0τXijr2003 þ β1τXijr2003  Dr
 
1 t ¼ τð Þ þ vjt þ ui þ εijrt ð5Þ
Y ijrt ¼ αþ β0tXijrt−1 þ β1tXijrt−1  Dr þ vjt þ ui þ εijrt ð6Þ
Note that Dr itself is not included in the left-hand side of the equation because it is
absorbed by establishment fixed effects. If β1t is positive, cutting earnings of employees
older than 60 allows the employer to increase Yijrt, the number of a certain group of
employees.
The industry coding changed in 2004 and 2009 in the BSWS. Thus, the sample is
limited to the following industries that can be coded consistently: manufacturing, trade,
finance, and services (medical and nursing + other services). For manufacturing and
services, I further divide the sample into 11 regions.11 For finance and trade industries,
I do not divide the sample into regions because some of the cohort–region–industry
cells have no observations. Thus, in total, there are 24 industry–region cells.
Table 12 The effect of the ratio of 55–59 years old in male full-time workers in the previous year
on log number of various types of employees, interacted with the change in earnings drop at age
60 between cohorts 1943–1945 and 1946–1948 (Continued)
Ratio of age 55–59
in 2009 × 2010
−0.353*** −0.432*** −0.509*** −0.267 3.798*** 1.952*** 0.663 2.042***
[0.111] [0.120] [0.130] [0.205] [0.566] [0.385] [0.412] [0.488]
Ratio of age 55–59
in 2009 × 2010 ×
earnings drop at
age 60
0.208 −0.151 0.296 −0.583 −2.19 −1.236 0.442 2.087
[0.355] [0.393] [0.426] [0.702] [1.795] [1.319] [1.296] [1.633]
Ratio of age 55–59
in 2010 × 2011
−0.324** −0.335** −0.425*** −0.671** 5.232*** 2.668*** 0.631 2.618***
[0.132] [0.141] [0.159] [0.325] [0.607] [0.451] [0.490] [0.543]
Ratio of age 55–59
in 2010 × 2011 ×
earnings drop at
age 60
0.155 −0.127 0.171 −0.065 −2.916 −1.659 −0.125 0.203
[0.391] [0.426] [0.475] [0.881] [1.934] [1.404] [1.482] [1.942]
Observations 10,681 10,681 10,681 10,681 10,681 10,681 10,681 10,681
R-squared 0.046 0.034 0.046 0.132 0.402 0.077 0.085 0.16
Number of
establishments
1531 1531 1531 1531 1531 1531 1531 1531
Note: Standard errors with clustering for establishment ID are presented in brackets. *, **, *** indicate coefficients are
statistically significantly different from 0 at the 10, 5, and 1 % levels, respectively. Control variables omitted from the
table include industry-year dummies. Establishment fixed effects are also controlled
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Table 11 presents the estimated coefficients of equation (5). Most of the interaction
terms between earnings drop and ratio of employees aged 55–59 in 2003 are statistically
insignificant. Somehow, some of the coefficients of the interaction terms are significantly
negative in column (3); that is, firms in which the elderly have lower earnings tend to de-
crease employment of those younger than 50. This result may be a reflection of the busi-
ness conditions at the regional level; that is, when a firm faces poor business conditions, it
tries to cut the earnings of the elderly and decreases the number of new hires.
Figure 5 plots the estimated effect of the ratio of employees aged 55–59 in 2003 at
the quartiles of the change in earnings drop, that is, β0tβ1tDr. The median is 0.045
(equivalent to a 4.5 % earnings cut), the 25th percentile is −0.072, and the 75th percent-
ile is 0.145. There seems to be no complementarity between earnings and employment
adjustments, except for part-time employees older than 60.
Table 12 and Fig. 6 repeat the same exercise for equation (6), which refers to the ef-
fect of the ratio of employees aged 55–59 in the previous year on various outcomes. It
is puzzling that the larger wage drop after 2006 is associated with the smaller decrease
in the number of employees younger than 50 in the early 2000s. For other groups,
again, there does not seem to be complementarily between earnings and employment
adjustments.
6 Conclusions
This paper examines the effect of increased elderly employment, mainly caused by the
legal obligation of continued employment up to the pension eligibility age enacted in
2006, on employment of other workers and elderly’s earnings.
Consistent with existing studies, such as Gruber et al. (2010), I find no evidence for
substitution between young full-time workers and elderly workers. As already pointed
Fig. 6 The estimated effects of the ratios of 55–59 years old in male full-time workers in the previous year, by
percentile of the changes in earnings drop at age 60 between cohorts 1943–1945 and cohorts 1946–1948
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out by Böheim (2014), since youth unemployment is a pressing problem in many devel-
oped countries, many of which also suffer from population aging, the lack of a trade-off
between young and old workers has an important policy implication. Despite the popu-
lar perception, policies to promote elderly employment do not harm employment pros-
pects of the young.
I also find substantial decline in earnings of baby boomers, who reach 60 after 2006,
in their early sixties. Combined with the modest negative effect on middle-aged female
part-time workers, the results of my study suggest that in response to the mandated
continued employment of elderly workers, firms primarily cut wages of elderly workers,
and some firms reduced the number of female part-time workers. Also, I find suggest-
ive evidence that wage cuts of the elderly did not lead to an increase in younger
workers’ employment.
Endnotes
1Among establishments with 30 or more employees, 81 % of establishments still set
60 as the mandatory retirement age, and as of 2012, most of them had instituted an ex-
plicit rule for either reemployment (80 %) or employment extension (20 %) rather than
extending the mandatory retirement age (General Survey on Working Conditions,
MHLW, 2012).
2This definition is found in many official publications of the Ministry of Health,
Labour and Welfare.
3The numbers of births are sourced from the Vital Statistics. Data for 1944–1946 are
not available because of the war.
4Strictly speaking, the relevant population refers to those who reached 60 after April
2006; however, the best information available from the Population Census provides the
age as of October 31.
5The industry codes changed a few times during 2002–2011. I use the code in the
2004 survey to maintain consistency.
6Admittedly, the composition is not representative of the Japanese labor force be-
cause the sample is limited to large establishments that have existed since a long time.
7Since a firm is likely to determine the number of employees for different age groups
or employment status jointly, ideally, it would be more efficient to estimate equations
with different dependent variables as a system, rather than estimating a separate regres-
sion for each dependent variable. Residuals are indeed strongly correlated for some
pairs of the dependent variables; however, it is practically difficult to incorporate fixed
effects in the SUR model. Omitting these correlations would not cause any bias to the
coefficients, though it reduces the efficiency of the estimates.
8We cannot calculate this value for variables including workers aged 25–29 and
younger, because they are likely to be hired within 5 years from the survey.
9Some readers may think the BSWS would be suitable for the first analysis presented
in Section 3, but it is not. First, the sample size of workers in each establishment in the
BSWS is too small to allow me to obtain the age composition within each establish-
ment or to construct the ratio of the number of elderly employees the establishment
must retain because of the revised EESL. Second, since the BSWS is a cross-sectional
survey, it is impossible to know how many employees were 59 years old 1 year ago.
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10This specification does not allow any changes in the slopes of age profiles across
cohorts, because it is practically difficult to allow all coefficients to change in a cohort
with a finite sample size. Note that if the wage curve had been flattened after the EESL
revision, it would have narrowed the earnings drop at age 60.
11The 11 regions are Hokkaido, Tohoku, Kitakanto (Tochigi, Ibaraki, and Gunma),
Minamikanto excluding Tokyo, Tokyo, Tokai (Shizuoka, Aichi, Gifu, Mie), Koshinetsu
and Hokuriku (Yamanashi, Niigata, Nagano, Toyama, Ishikawa, and Fukui), Kinki,
Chugoku, Shikoku, and Kyushu. Regions other than Kitakanto, Tokai, Koshinetsu, and
Hokuriku are the same as the ten regions officially defined by the Statistics Bureau.
Competing interests
The IZA Journal of Labor Policy is committed to the IZA Guiding Principles of Research Integrity. The author declares
that she has observed these principles.
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank the anonymous referees and the editor for the useful remarks.
This research is supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grant Numbers 23730235, 15K17072 (PI: Ayako Kondo), and 24330074
(PI: Ryo Kambayashi). The use of microdata of the Employment Trend Survey, the Establishment and Enterprise
Census, and the Basic Survey on Wage Structure is approved by the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare and by
the Statistics Bureau of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications. I especially thank Hitoshi Shigeoka for our
extensive discussion about empirical strategy in the early stages of this project and Ryo Kambayashi for helping me to
obtain the data. I am also grateful to the editor and an anonymous reviewer of this journal, Karine Ishii, and seminar
participants at the RIETI/IZA Workshop: Changing Demography and the Labor Market, Kyoto Summer Workshop on
Applied Economics, University of Tokyo, and the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare for valuable comments.
Responsible editor: Daiji Kawaguchi
Received: 23 June 2015 Accepted: 7 January 2016
References
Ariga K, Kambayashi R (2010) Employment and wage adjustments at firms under distress in Japan: an analysis based
upon a survey. J Jpn Int Econ 24(2):213–235
Böheim R (2014) The effect of early retirement schemes on youth employment. IZA World of Labor., June 2014
Gruber J, Milligan K, Wise DA (2010) Introduction and Summary. In: Gruber J, Wise DA (eds) Social security programs
and retirement around the world: the relationship to youth employment. University of Chicago Press, Chicago,
pp 1–45
Hamaaki J, Hori M, Maeda S, Murata K (2012) Changes in the Japanese employment system in the two lost decades.
Ind Labor Relat Rev 65(4):810–846
Kawaguchi D, Ohtake F (2007) Testing the morale theory of nominal wage rigidity. Ind Labor Relat Rev 61(1):59–74
Kondo A (2014) Koureisha Koyo Anteiho no Eikyo Bunseki, Iwamoto Y, Kantori M, Shioji E and Teruyama H eds,
Gendai Keizaigaku no Choryu 2014, Tokyokeizai, Tokyo, Japan.
Kondo A, Shigeoka H (2015) The effectiveness of government intervention to promote elderly employment: evidence
from elderly employment stabilization law., http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2341680
Martins PS, Novo AA and Portugal P (2009) Increasing the legal retirement age: the impact on wages, worker flows and
firm performance. IZA Discussion Paper No. 4187.
Munnel AH, and Wu AY (2012) Will delayed retirement by the baby boomers lead to higher unemployment among
younger workers? Center for Retirement Research at Boston College Working Paper
2012-22.
Nagano H (2014). Koureisou no Koyo to Hoka no Nenreisou no Koyou—Koyo-doko-chosa Jigyoshohyo Kohyo Data no
Bunseki. The Japanese Journal of Labour Studies, No. 643 (in Japanese)
Oshio T, Shimizutani S, Oishi AS (2010) Does social security induce withdrawal of the old from the labor force and
create jobs for the young? The case of Japan. In: Gruber J, Wise DA (eds) Social security programs and retirement
around the world: the relationship to youth employment. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, pp 217–241
Vestad OL (2013) Early retirement and youth employment in Norway., Presented at European Association of Labour
Economics
Zhang C (2012) The relationship between elderly employment and youth employment: evidence from China.
University Library of Munich. MPRA Paper 3722.
Kondo IZA Journal of Labor Policy  (2016) 5:2 Page 23 of 23
